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Myth, History and Revisionism:
The Black Loyalists Revisited
IT IS CHARACTERISTIC OF OUR profession to challenge and revise standard
interpretations. Historiography classes eagerly watch the development of historical
understanding as different scholars subject common bodies of fact to new levels of
questioning. Even if it lacks the excitement of uncovering new material, revision can
make a considerable intellectual contribution by keeping archival researchers on their
toes and by bringing conceptual variety into our analysis. As a spectator sport it has
a select but well-defined and usually appreciative audience in the history classroom.
And sometimes, innovative historical explanations can actually make a difference in
how the general public perceives not only the past per se but the legacies of the past
and the nature of the communities surviving that past. This lays a burden of
responsibility on the revisionists; their challenges have to meet the same professional
standards as the original interpretations they scrutinize.
Were the black Loyalists really Loyalists? That is a legitimate question, and a rather
interesting one. Certainly it is a concept that has become “normal”, and so it is a likely
candidate for reinterpretation. One of my teaching duties at the University of Waterloo
is History 250, our introductory historiography course for new history majors. Over the
term we examine a series of historical writings, testing their evidence, dissecting their
arguments and attempting to discern their perspective and intent. It is an exercise, and
it can help students better understand the topic under review and, more importantly, it
can promote their appreciation of the historian’s craft so that they can identify both the
positive and negative features of the example at hand to be emulated, or avoided, in
their own historical writing. Is “The Black Loyalist Myth in Atlantic Canada” an
appropriate object for such an exercise? Its author, Barry Cahill, is senior archivist at
the Public Archives of Nova Scotia, an earlier version has already been presented
publicly at a distinguished heritage conference, and it is being published now in
Atlantic Canada’s flagship historical journal. Its revisionist themes have been lent
credibility by this exposure, and so it invites careful, and critical, attention.
Historical interpretation stands or falls on its management of the evidence.
Unfortunately Cahill’s article rests on a faulty foundation. It makes a number of
clearly erroneous, and easily avoidable, statements about the available evidence.
Fundamental to Cahill’s argument that the black Loyalists should not be regarded as
Loyalists is his allegation that they were not regarded as Loyalists, by the white
Loyalists or British, by the American Patriots, or even by themselves (p. 80). This is
an essential claim because, had they been so regarded, then obviously the notion
already existed and could not have been “invented” as a modern myth by misguided
academics as Cahill alleges (p. 77). But this claim is not upheld, for there is a
substantial body of contemporary evidence indicating recognition of the African-
American fugitives as Loyalists, evidence originating with each of the groups Cahill
has identified as rejecting such recognition.
Let me begin with evidence that the African Americans who migrated to the
Maritimes in 1783 did indeed consider themselves Loyalists and worthy of the same
respect and rewards granted to all other Loyalists. In a petition to Governor John Parr
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on behalf of their fellow veterans of the Black Pioneers, Thomas Peters and Murphy
Still claimed that when they swore allegiance to the Crown in New York in 1776, they
were promised to be treated the same as the rest of the king’s soldiers. Since they had
behaved faithfully in accordance with their oath, they asked Parr to grant them lands
and provisions on the same basis as the other newly-arrived migrants from the
American Colonies.1 Both Peters and Still had been fugitive slaves before joining the
British. Thomas Brownspriggs sent a memorial to Parr expressing his surprise that he
and other “Black Men Inhabitants of this Province . . . have never received any Lands,
although they have been employed in the King’s service during the late War”.2 In
New Brunswick, similarly, Robert Lawson and others petitioned Governor Thomas
Carleton “That your Petitioners came here in the time of Refugees, That they were
Promised Land and Every Thing that others were, None of which they have
Received”.3 Zimri Armstrong asked Carleton “to grant me some [land] as well as
other indigent loyalists”.4 William Fisher described himself as “a Black Man” and a
“poor indegent Loyalist hopeing your Excellency will take it into consideration and
will grant me the same as is granted to all other loyalists”.5 When Thomas Peters
presented his two famous petitions directly to the British cabinet in 1790, he
submitted the first “on Behalf of himself and others the Black Pioneers and loyal
Black Refugees”, and he introduced his second petition by explaining that he had been
“deputed by his Fellow Soldiers and by other Free Negroes and People of Colour
Refugees”.6 Reference to themselves as “refugees” by these black petitioners did not
mean refugees from slavery; it was common parlance in the 1780s for “Loyalists”.
The documents are full of white Loyalists describing themselves as “refugees” or
“loyal refugees”, in exactly the same way as the black Loyalists.
There are two messages to be taken from these records: one, that the black migrants
were claiming Loyalist status for themselves and declaring their insistence upon equal
treatment; and two, that their claims had not been satisfied at the time of their
petitions. Obviously, they were not receiving equal treatment. But does this
discrimination mean that they were not regarded as Loyalists at all, as Cahill
contends? During the Revolutionary War British and Loyalist military authorities
made a clear distinction between fugitive slaves who came voluntarily to the British,
and those who simply fell into British hands in the course of their campaigns. The
Clinton Proclamation itself made such a distinction: those who came voluntarily
would be considered as free British subjects; those captured from the rebels would be
kept as slaves or sold for the benefit of their captors.7 Thomas Peters carried a typical
certificate, issued at the end of the war, bearing witness that he had sworn allegiance,
had served “faithfully and honestly”, and was “a good and faithful subject of Great
1 21 August 1784, Vol. 359, Public Archives of Nova Scotia [PANS].
2 Land Papers, 9 December 1788, Thomas Brownspriggs, PANS.
3 Land Petitions, 21 February 1784, No. 12, Sunbury County, Provincial Archives of New Brunswick
[PANB].
4 Land Petitions, 1785, No. 78, Saint John County, PANB.
5 Land Petitions, March 1785, No. 127, York County, PANB.
6 December 1790, FO 4/1, Public Record Office [PRO].
7 30 June 1779, Carleton Transcripts, British Headquarters Papers in America, New York Public
Library [NYPL].
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Britain”.8 Commander-in-Chief Sir Guy Carleton sent orders that the Black Pioneers
embarking for Nova Scotia in October 1783 were to receive town lots and, if they
were to be farmers, a 100-acre country lot, the same as white Loyalists of similar
rank.9
As I described at length in The Black Loyalists,10 these promises and orders were
never fulfilled. The process was far more complicated, however, than the simplistic
notion purveyed in “The Black Loyalist Myth” that as fugitive slaves they were not
capable of being numbered among the Loyalists. The list of “Loyalists . . . Leaving
Charleston for Halifax”, the “return of Loyalists gone from New York to Nova
Scotia”, the “Muster Rolls of Annapolis and Digby”, the enumeration of “Disbanded
Soldiers and Other Loyalists recommended for Lands on the Dartmouth Side”, all
included among the Loyalists those black people who had fled slavery and joined the
British. Slaves brought by white Loyalists were identified separately.11 The unequal
land grants that were distributed to the black Loyalists were laid out under general
orders for surveys “for Loyal Emigrants and Disbanded Corps”. The “Board of
Agents for Locating the Loyalists on Lands” processed the actual grants. The grants
were recorded under the heading “Loyalist Land Grants”.12 Governor Thomas
Carleton would later insist that the black Loyalists had been allotted land “in the same
proportion and on the same conditions with all other Inhabitants whether Loyalists or
disbanded Soldiers”.13 The governor’s assertion was decidedly contrary to their actual
experience, but at the same time he was clearly identifying them as Loyalists. The
Loyalist Claims Commission did entertain petitions from fugitive slaves, though the
accompanying article suggests otherwise (p. 79), deciding in the case of David King
that he “like many of the Blacks had gained his Liberty by the War and ought to be
satisfied, but under all the Circumstances of the Case we think it very reasonable to
give him so small a sum as £5”.14 The definitive acknowledgement, however, came
from Sir Henry Clinton, the commander-in-chief who issued the 1779 Proclamation
inviting fugitive slaves to join the British. Endorsing Thomas Peters’ complaint to the
British cabinet in 1790, Clinton wrote that Peters had been “a very active Serjt. in a
very usefull Corps”, and that he and the other “poor blacks” in the Maritimes “seem
to be the only Loyalists that have been neglected”.15
They called themselves Loyalists; the highest ranking military authorities called
them Loyalists. It hardly seems necessary to add that the Patriots also distinguished
8 Issued 26 October 1783 by Lt. Col. Allan Stewart, Commander of the Black Pioneers in which
Thomas Peters was a sergeant, FO 4/1, PRO.
9 21 October 1783, Carleton to Fox, Carleton Transcripts, NYPL.
10 The Black Loyalists: The Search for a Promised Land in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone, 1783-1870,
2nd ed. (Toronto, 1992).
11 Morse to Fox, 23 August 1783 (from Charleston to Halifax), Carleton Transcripts, NYPL; Vol. 369
(from New York to Nova Scotia), Vol. 376 (Annapolis and Digby), Vol. 359 (Dartmouth), PANS.
12 Council Minutes, 5 August 1784, Vol. 213; Circular Letter, Provincial Secretary (Richard Bulkeley),
26 May 1785, Bulkeley to Isaac Wilkins and the Board of Agents, 20 November 1786; Shelburne
Records, Loyalist Land Grants, PANS.
13 Emphasis in original. Carleton to Dundas,13 December 1791, CO 188/4, PRO.
14 King was described by his wartime commander, Col. Edward Fanning, as “a very honest, Loyal and
deserving Blackman”: AO 12/99, PRO.
15 Clinton to Grenville, 26 December 1790, FO 4/1, PRO.
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the black Loyalists from other runaways, Cahill’s contrary statement notwithstanding
(p. 83). The basis for the distinction was the black Loyalists’ adherence to the British
cause. Running away from slavery had been made a crime in Virginia in 1680, but in
1775 the Virginia Convention legislated the death penalty for fugitive slaves captured
with the British or even trying to join the British. In April 1776, for example, two
fugitives mistakenly approached a Patriot ship and declared their wish to serve Lord
Dunmore. They were immediately tried and executed. That same 1775 Virginia
Convention, on the other hand, announced that apprehended runaways who were not
suspected of serving the British were to be restored to their owners or, if unclaimed,
to be sold for the public benefit.16 Fugitives responding to the Dunmore Proclamation
could be “summarily executed without benefit of clergy — as if they had been tried
and convicted of high treason”.17 And why were their actions treasonous, when the
simple act of running away was an ordinary crime? Because they had declared in
favour of the enemy, the Crown; that is, because they were Loyalists who wanted to
ensure the continuation of British authority in America. Henry Melchior Muhlenberg
wrote in 1777 of the African Americans that “They secretly wished that the British
army might win, for then all Negro slaves will gain their freedom. It is said that this
sentiment is almost universal among the Negroes in America”.18 Recognizing the
same phenomenon, Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur wrote that the slaves had all
become “Toryfied”.19 Both these observers were Patriot sympathizers, expressing a
concern that was widespread in Patriot circles.
There are a number of other inaccurate allegations in “The Black Loyalist Myth”
that should be addressed. Cahill writes (p. 83) that “By and large the fugitive slaves
were not active participants in the civil war”, in contrast to “freeborn or manumitted
Blacks”. There is no satisfactory way of knowing how many fugitives there were, let
alone how many actually served the British. There is, however, one document which
itemizes the wartime experience of Birchtown men, formerly fugitive slaves. Of a
total of 151 adult males, 68 men had seen military service as soldiers, sailors or
pioneers.20 That is 45 per cent. It cannot be claimed that this percentage is
representative, for we do not have the documentation for analysis. One wartime list
enumerated 1,500 fugitives then with the British at Charleston, 773 of whom were
specified as employed with the Royal Artillery (266), the Pioneers (192) and smaller
numbers with the Royal Fusiliers, the Hessians, the commissary general and the
hospital.21 Again, the percentage is impressive. It seems unlikely that they would
have been matched by freeborn or manumitted African Americans, for, as Ira Berlin
has pointed out, the number of freeborn black people was extremely small at the time
16 Sylvia R. Frey, “Between Slavery and Freedom: Virginia Blacks in the American Revolution”,
Journal of Southern History, XLIX (1983), pp. 383-6.
17 Barry Cahill, “The Black Loyalist Myth in Atlantic Canada”, note 28.
18 Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, trans. T.G. Tappert and J.W. Doverstien, 3 vols.
(Philadelphia, 1942-58), vol. III, p.78 (journal entry for 20 September 1777).
19 J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, Sketches of Eighteenth Century America: More Letters from an
American Farmer, ed. H.L. Bourdin, R.H. Gabriel and S.T. Williams (New Haven, 1925), p. 301.
20 “List of the Blacks of Birch Town who gave in their Names for Sierra Leone”, November 1791, CO
217/63, PRO.
21 Alexander Leslie’s Letterbooks, Return of Negroes, 17 July 1780, Emmet Collection, NYPL.
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of the revolutionary outbreak, and most of those manumitted by masters were too old
or otherwise incapacitated for productive labour. That is why they had been
manumitted, and that is why their military contribution was bound to be less
significant.22 Nor is it possible to make an accurate comparison with white Loyalist
wartime participation, although Paul Smith has calculated that it was 15 per cent of
adult white male Loyalists who actually “took up arms in service of the Crown”.23
Given the nature of the available evidence, it would be much more reasonable for
Cahill to conclude that fugitive slaves were over-represented as active participants in
the war to suppress the American rebellion.
In an apparent attempt to deny agency to the black Loyalists, Cahill refers to them
constantly as “freed” rather than “free”, and even as “stolen property of the rebels” (p.
83), as if the British forces had marched in and liberated them from their rebel
claimants. It is in this context that Cahill discusses the Peace Treaty and the
evacuation of the black Loyalists to the Maritimes, something he calls a “flagrant
violation” of the Treaty (p. 86). As I have documented in The Black Loyalists and
other publications, the African-American fugitives freed themselves, by running away
from their enslavement. British military commanders issued proclamations declaring
that fugitives (who had already run away) would be recognized as free British subjects
upon voluntarily joining the British. The people who thus became “black Loyalists”
were contrasted with the thousands of American slaves who were confiscated, stolen
and sequestered by British forces during the war. When the British promised, in
Article VII of the Provisional Treaty (and later the final Treaty), not to carry away any
American property including “Negroes”, it was the latter category that was meant, the
contraband of war, not the voluntary fugitives. Of course the Americans insisted that
it meant any black person who had ever been held in slavery, but Sir Guy Carleton
pointed out that by the time the Provisional Treaty was signed in 1782, the black
Loyalists were no longer American property but free British subjects, and therefore
could not be included under Article VII. Only those who had been taken by the
British, or those who came to the British after the signing of the Provisional Treaty
(and who were therefore “property” at the time of the signing), needed to be restored
to their American claimants. As Carleton patiently explained to George Washington,
the black Loyalists were already free and “I had no right to deprive them of that liberty
I found them possessed of”.24
I mentioned above that all these errors were easily avoidable. The reason is that
every document cited in the preceding pages was listed in the footnotes of The Black
22 Ira Berlin, “The Revolution in Black Life”, in Alfred F. Young, ed., The American Revolution: Essays
in the History of American Radicalism (DeKalb, Ill., 1976), p. 352.
23 Paul H. Smith, “The American Loyalists: Notes on Their Organization and Numerical Strength”,
William and Mary Quarterly, XXV (1968), p. 267.
24 Carleton to Washington, 12 May 1783, Vol. 369, PANS; memo summarizing the British
interpretation of the Treaty, fols. 112-4, CO 5/8, PRO; “An Interview Between Lord Dorchester [Guy
Carleton] and General Washington at Orange Town, 9 May 1783”, Chatham Ms., 1780-92, Bundle
344, National Archives of Canada [NAC]. The American argument differed, but Washington’s
account of the discussion over the disposition of the “free” black Loyalists matched Carleton’s. See
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington (Washington DC, 1931-44), XXVI, pp.
401-14, including Washington to Carleton, 6 May 1783.
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Loyalists and/or other titles mentioned in Cahill’s note 3, where he identifies his
sources. And there are other indications that the secondary sources listed in his note 3
were not examined with sufficient care. To support the contention that a small group,
or perhaps even this author alone, “invented” the black Loyalists, Cahill contrasts my
interpretation with that of more sophisticated modern scholars who avoid the term and
the concept. “[F]or Winks”, Cahill would have his readers believe, “fugitive slaves
and Loyalists were mutually exclusive” (p. 79). Robin Winks makes no such
distinction. The Blacks in Canada has an index category for “Loyalist Negroes”, and
the many pages indicated there include the discussion of wartime runaways, the
British refusal to return them to their American claimants, their life in Nova Scotia
and their migration to Sierra Leone. Winks distinguishes them from the Maroons and
the Refugees of the War of 1812, but nowhere does he omit from the Loyalist
category those who were fugitives. When Winks refers to “Loyalist Negroes” who
applied for a land grant, the Brindley Town people he specifies were fugitive slaves
when they joined the British. Though “Loyalist Negroes” is his preferred term,
writing when he did, he also speaks of “Loyalists, white and black” who had difficulty
with their land grants. Winks has been sorely misrepresented in Cahill’s article.25
Ellen Gibson Wilson is another who allegedly “stops short of calling fugitive slaves
Black Loyalists” (p. 85). The confusion almost seems deliberate. Wilson’s book The
Loyal Blacks has an index category “Loyalists: black — in war . . . ; — as refugees
. . .”, exactly parallelling “Loyalists: white — in war . . . ; — as refugees. . .”. Under
“Loyalists: black” Wilson includes the fugitives who responded to the wartime
proclamations, mentioning by name David George, Boston King, Thomas Peters and
Mary Perth, all of whom were claimed as slaves by American Patriots, ran away and
joined the British, and later migrated to Nova Scotia. Nowhere does Wilson hint that
some of the people she calls “Loyal Blacks” or “Loyalists: black” were more or less
qualified for that designation because of a previous condition of servitude.26
What my book did was to standardize the term “black Loyalist”, which has since
come into common usage. However, the concept was there from the time black
Americans swore allegiance to the Crown during the Revolution. Winks and Wilson
do not differ from me in this respect. And neither do the other scholars mentioned by
Cahill. Stewart MacNutt (Cahill, note 34) invited me to join the Programme for
Loyalist Studies and Publications, with the specific commission to prepare a volume
of documents on the black Loyalists. He explicitly endorsed the former fugitives as
Loyalists, in public meetings and private correspondence with me.27 Unfortunately
Professor MacNutt’s death led to the abandonment of the Programme, but in the
meantime I remained a happy member of what Wallace Brown has called “an
historical version of ‘the largest permanent floating crap game’”.28 It was through the
colloquia and conferences organized under the Programme that scholars such as
25 Robin W. Winks, The Blacks in Canada. A History, 2nd ed. ([1971] Montreal, 1997), pp. 32, 35-45,
53, 61-78, 95, 134, 140-1, 534.
26 Ellen Gibson Wilson, The Loyal Blacks (New York, 1976), passim.
27 Preparing this response I consulted my photocopies made for Prof. MacNutt’s series, and discovered
tucked in the files my correspondence related to the project. The earliest seems to date from January
1971.
28 Wallace Brown, “Loyalist Historiography”, Acadiensis, IV, 1 (Autumn 1974), p. 134.
Acadiensis94
Wallace Brown and Neil MacKinnon became familiar with my own research, and vice
versa, before my thesis was completed and long before my book was published (p. 85
and notes 10, 36). That is why MacKinnon would avoid duplication in his own
doctoral thesis on “The Loyalist Experience in Nova Scotia”, which was being
researched and written in the same period. To write, as Cahill does (p. 85), that
MacKinnon “excluded” the black Loyalists because they were “so marginal” to
Loyalist history, is to misunderstand the nature and purpose of doctoral research. The
whole point is to say something different. Notice that in his book, This Unfriendly
Soil: The Loyalist Experience in Nova Scotia, 1783-1791, Neil MacKinnon does
include considerable notice of the black Loyalists.29 Obviously a book is a different
creature from a thesis, and in the published version the author was more concerned to
tell a complete story. It is perverse as well to portray Robert Allen as somehow
ambivalent about the black Loyalists (Cahill, note 7). Allen explained in his Loyalist
Literature that in Nova Scotia the freedom of the black Loyalists was “nominal”, an
assessment entirely in accord with my own, but he did not challenge their Loyalist
credentials. In fact he called them a “unique Loyalist minority”.30
One point on which Cahill and I might agree is a neglect of the black Loyalists in
the historiography of Atlantic Canada prior to ca. 1970, and the absence of a
widespread public awareness or folk tradition about the Loyalist origins of many
black communities (p. 79). When in 1948 Bruce Fergusson compiled a documentary
history of the Nova Scotia black population, he entitled it The Establishment of the
Negroes in Nova Scotia between the War of 1812 and the Winning of Responsible
Government, completely overlooking the black Loyalists and the slaves who had been
there generations before 1812.31 This was not untypical. The Rev. W.P. Oliver, a
highly respected leader of the African United Baptist Association, wrote in 1963:
“The majority of Negroes in Nova Scotia today are descendants of the 1812 Refugees.
Those who came to Nova Scotia prior to this date either returned to the United States
or migrated to Sierra Leone”.32 Of course the neglect was not absolute. By Cahill’s
own count, there were Benjamin West, T.C. Haliburton, Evelyn Harvey, Phyllis
Blakeley and Wallace Brown who recognized the black Loyalists, and there were
others Cahill does not mention. Furthermore, the fact that the black people of
Birchtown sought historical recognition in 1963 (p. 81), shows that they had not lost
touch with their origins. Still, it remains true that most people, including most black
people, had not paid particular attention to this aspect of Canadian history. The Black
Loyalists of New Brunswick Association and the Black Loyalist Heritage Society are
29 Neil MacKinnon, This Unfriendly Soil: The Loyalist Experience in Nova Scotia, 1783-1791 (Kingston
and Montreal, 1986).
30 Robert S. Allen, Loyalist Literature: An annotated bibliographic guide to the writings on the
Loyalists of the American Revolution (Toronto, 1982), pp. 52-4.
31 C.B. Fergusson, A Documentary Study of the Establishment of the Negroes in Nova Scotia between
the War of 1812 and the Winning of Responsible Government (Halifax, 1948).
32 W.P. Oliver, “Adult Education in the Negro Communities of Nova Scotia”, Canadian Baptist Home
Missions Digest, VI (1963/64), p. 146. Cahill makes a similar error when he writes that “most” of the
black Loyalists migrated to Sierra Leone in 1792 (p. 4). About one-third of the total black Loyalist
population migrated.
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only recently established.33 It is not unlikely that the availability of published
historical writing has stimulated the renewed interest and awareness since the 1970s.
If my book on The Black Loyalists participated in this revival, I can only feel
satisfaction. If all those other observers from Benjamin West to Phyllis Blakeley had
already recognized the black Loyalists, I cannot claim to have “invented” the concept.
The basic argument of “The Black Loyalist Myth in Atlantic Canada” seems to be
that a specific group of ideologically-motivated scholars, of whom I am the
“normative” example, “invented” something Cahill identifies as “the Black Loyalist
myth” (p. 79). Given the evidence outlined in the preceding section, this argument is
demonstrably untenable and irresponsible. Nevertheless the exercise upon which we
are embarked demands that it receive clinical attention. Cahill’s argument sets out
with the supposition that a person who was a slave when the Revolution began was
not “capable” of being a Loyalist (p. 76). This disqualification is stated repeatedly but
never explained. “The implied definition of Black Loyalists is Black people who
were loyal to the crown, and it excluded ex hypothesi the freed Blacks — precisely
because they were fugitive slaves” (p. 79). This is a circular argument. Loyalists are
defined to exclude fugitives, so fugitives are excluded as Loyalists. “Blacks
collectively were freed, not free, and they were not Loyalists, but fugitive slaves who
absconded from the rebels in order to secure their liberty at the invitation of the British
military” (p. 81). Only “freeborn or manumitted” African Americans were “capable
of being Loyalists” (p. 76). A precondition for this argument, apparently, must be
that the black Loyalists (other than the freeborn or manumitted) were “freed” by the
British, but if that is so, how can they be regarded as having “absconded” from their
rebel claimants? The logic does not hold. Quite apart from the moral implication of
the term “abscond”, as a verb it requires volition, initiative, agency; it means that they
ran away, not that they were “freed”. Neither is it supportable historically. The
fugitives who sought out the British swore allegiance to the Crown, the one
“qualification” for inclusion in the Loyalist category, and surely the oath of an unfree
person would have been meaningless. The distinction was drawn between slaves of
rebel claimants who were involuntarily brought under British control, and those who
came voluntarily. There is no evidence that a prior condition of freedom was a
criterion, only that the claimant should not be a Loyalist; i.e., slaves of Loyalists could
not themselves become Loyalists, but all other African Americans, freeborn,
previously manumitted or fugitives from rebel claimants, were eligible.
Another circular element in Cahill’s argument is the notion that the terms
“Loyalist” and “fugitive slave” are fundamentally incompatible, because “Loyalists
defended colour slavery” (p. 82). But wait: if the fugitive slaves were Loyalists, then
Loyalists did not, by definition, defend colour slavery. Only if an arbitrary condition
is set — that Loyalists defended slavery — can the fugitives be excluded from the
definition. The solution seems to be to make the definition more realistic, rather than
to impose an idiosyncratic condition with neither logical nor historical justification.
Of course it is true that some Loyalists (white) owned slaves; it is also true that some
Loyalists (black) were fugitive slaves. Should one cancel out the other? If so, which
33 Black Loyalists of New Brunswick Association, 92 St. Catherine Street, Saint John, N.B. E2J 2J3;
Black Loyalist Heritage Society, 157 Water Street, Shelburne, N.S. B0T 1WO.
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one? Besides, it cannot be shown that even among white Loyalists there was absolute
support for slavery. Approximately 1200 slaves were brought into the Maritimes by
Loyalists. How many “owners” there were has not been compiled. Some brought
several dozen, a few more than 50 each. It is therefore only possible to say that a few
hundred white Loyalists owned slaves, out of a total of more than 30,000. This is still
not an account of Loyalist support for slavery: the thousands who owned no slaves
might have approved, or they might not. The evidence goes both ways. The power
of the state and the courts supported slavery on behalf of society in general, and (as I
argue in The Black Loyalists) this prevailing condition had serious implications for
the exercise of freedom by the black Loyalists. But if some of those white Loyalists
opposed slavery, or were even indifferent, were they thereby no longer eligible to be
considered Loyalists? This would follow logically from Cahill’s argument. On the
other side, in 1807 a group of 27 white Loyalist slave-owners, claiming among them
84 slaves, asked the Nova Scotia assembly to clarify the title to their “property”. The
petitioners were “far from pretending to advocate Slavery as a System”, they stated
apologetically, but “owing to certain doubts now entertained by The King’s Courts of
Law in this Province, such property is rendered wholly untenable by your petitioners
whose Negro Servants are daily leaving their service and setting your petitioners at
defiance”. The Loyalist-dominated assembly declined to grant their petition.34 This
seems to confirm that some (white) Loyalists must have opposed slavery, even to
generate the doubts that demanded clarification from the legislature. The equation of
Loyalist and supporter of slavery cannot be maintained. Either some white Loyalists
were not Loyalists, according to Cahill’s definition, or it was not impossible for a
Loyalist to oppose slavery.
Cahill makes a major distinction between the previously free and those who
became free during the Revolution.35 According to “The Black Loyalist Myth”, only
the former “qualified” as Loyalists. The previously free had a “different mindset from
the fugitive-slave refugees”, Cahill claims, and this is revealed through their different
attitudes towards the Sierra Leone exodus. These attitudes, purportedly, “are the key
to unlocking the Black Loyalist myth” (p. 84, emphasis added). Stephen Blucke, the
one example offered by Cahill, did claim to be freeborn (and therefore capable of
being a “real” Loyalist by Cahill’s definition), and he did oppose the Sierra Leone
migration. There is one surviving document recording this opposition, the only
available source for the “key” to unlocking the “myth”. This was a petition forwarded
to the British government by Stephen Skinner, a white Loyalist landowner in
Shelburne, in which some Birchtown black Loyalists declared the migration a foolish
mistake and asked the government for financial assistance to “make us comfortable
on our little farms”.36 Skinner himself opposed the exodus, complaining that the loss
34 Winks, The Blacks in Canada, p. 106.
35 Cahill states that “Many, perhaps most”, of the previously free, whom he is willing to recognize as
genuine black Loyalists, “do not appear in the Inspection Roll of fugitive-slave refugees”(p. 79) . In
fact 409 of the people listed there claimed to have been legally free before the Revolution, including
Stephen Blucke. They were evacuated along with the fugitives, settled together with them, and as a
group became indistinguishable upon arrival in Nova Scotia. Cahill may be right that there were many
more who were not on the list, but he could have no way of knowing that.
36 Enclosed in Skinner to Dundas, n.d. [Petition dated 1 November 1791], CO 217/63, PRO.
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of black labour seriously damaged the profits of large landowners such as himself.37
It was Skinner who collected the signatures. But quite apart from any external
pressures, Cahill’s “key” hangs on the claim that the signatories to the Birchtown
petition were previously free, a condition that gave them a different “mindset” and
made them opposed to the exodus while the former fugitives’ “mindset” made them
accept the Sierra Leone offer. It should be clearly understood that the Birchtown
petition of 1 November 1791 is the only piece of evidence we have of any group of
black Loyalists deliberately rejecting the Sierra Leone opportunity. Since it is such
an important document, I had photocopied it (in anticipation of the MacNutt
documentary volume). After reading Cahill’s paper, I spent an afternoon in my attic
examining the signatures and tracing the origins of the signatories through other
documents I had at hand. Stephen Blucke’s signature is at the top, and we believe he
was freeborn. Of the other 51 names on the petition, I was able to trace 27. One,
James Newcombe, claimed free birth, and one, Isabella Gibbons, had been purchased
by Margaret (Mrs. Stephen) Blucke and given her freedom. Two others had names
that belonged to both former fugitives and to persons who were previously free (one
by birth and one by manumission), and it was not possible to tell which had done the
signing. That makes a definite total of three free persons (including Stephen Blucke),
and the possible addition of two more, out of the 28 traceable names. The remaining
23 were all definitely identifiable as wartime fugitive slaves. Even if the doubtful
cases were previously free, even if all the untraceable names38 belonged to persons
who were previously free, that still leaves a very substantial proportion of former
fugitives as signatories to this petition rejecting the Sierra Leone migration. It cannot
support the contention that there was a different “mindset”, or that only the previously
free were disinclined to migrate. And by the way, there were freeborn or manumitted
black Loyalists who did participate in the Sierra Leone exodus and there was at least
one person, Scipio Channell, who signed the Birchtown petition and later, evidently,
changed his mind.
What is the test of a Loyalist? Throughout Cahill’s argument there runs the
presumption that there is a standard definition, and that the African-American
fugitives do not measure up: “they were not Loyalists in the historical sense of the
word” (p. 80; see also p. 76 where a “full-blown historical sense of the term” is
mentioned). But there is, unfortunately, no universal consensus, no historical “sense”
that everybody accepts. As Paul H. Smith has written, “loyalism meant different
things to different persons in different situations”.39 Cahill drops a clue to his own
understanding of the term when he says that the slaves did not flee “on the grounds of
political principle or expedience”, but simply to gain their freedom (p. 83). Why this
would not be “expedient” is left unexplained. Robert Calhoon, a considerable
authority on this subject, has written that Loyalists, and he had in mind white
Loyalists, were motivated by “self-interest, temperament, conscience, intellect, fear
37 Petition of “Proprietors of Lands” to Henry Dundas, 16 May 1793, CO 217/63, PRO.
38 I mean, of course, untraceable in my attic in Waterloo, Ontario. It is quite likely that additional
documentation exists elsewhere that could illuminate more of the names.
39 Smith, “The American Loyalists”, p. 261.
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and plain confusion”.40 Canadian scholars George Rawlyk and Ann Condon have
explained that (white) Loyalists did not often understand, nor were they particularly
motivated by, an ideological Loyalism, and even when they were, Janice Potter adds,
the ideology was not always the same: some wanted to maintain the old pre-
revolutionary colonial system, others wanted a reformed and revitalized British
Empire. Small wonder David Wilson entitles his review of this literature “The
Ambivalent Loyalists”.41 There is, Cahill complains, “a lack of clarity concerning
how to define Black Loyalism” (p. 78), but this could and should be said about
Loyalism in general. Must there then be a special test for black Loyalists?
Apparently so, for Cahill criticizes Graham Russell Hodges for defining them as “free
and enslaved men, women, and children who allied with the British in the American
Revolution”, which Cahill dismisses as “a definition of ‘Loyalists’ with the word
‘Black’ added” (p. 87). The Hodges solution seems eminently sensible to me. The
Canadian Encyclopedia defines Loyalists as “American colonists of varied ethnic
backgrounds who supported the British cause during the American Revolution . . . for
highly diverse reasons”.42 One of those reasons, surely, could be freedom from
slavery.
Black Loyalists did undoubtedly “ally with the British” and “support the British
cause”, and it would be accurate to add that their motivation included political
principle. As Cahill correctly states, “They anticipated that Britain would win and
that the royal bounty of freedom would be extended to all slaves” (p. 83). In other
words it was not just their own freedom that was at issue, but the freedom of all
African Americans; they were fighting for a United Empire without slavery, for racial
equality. As a political vision, this ranks with the best. This is an ideological
commitment to British victory. Not all runaways offered their services to the British.
Note that the Virginia Convention recognized the difference with different penalties.
In The Black Loyalists, and in greater detail in “Blacks as American Loyalists: The
Slaves’ War for Independence”,43 I have described how slaves managed to escape
from their rebel claimants. Thousands, tens of thousands, did so. Thomas Jefferson,
who lost 30 of his own slaves, estimated in 1778 that 30,000 Virginia slaves ran away
from Patriot claimants. This would be more than 10 per cent of the Virginia slave
population of about 250,000. Jefferson’s figures were not intended to be precise, but
Sylvia Frey claims that “Good evidence . . . strongly suggests that Jefferson’s
estimates of slave losses might in fact be reliable”.44 John Hope Franklin writes that
75 per cent of Georgia’s 15,000 slaves fled from Patriot claimants during the
Revolution, and another 25,000 from South Carolina.45 Some of these numerous
fugitives sought refuge in territory still under Native control; some moved to distant
40 Robert Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781 (New York, 1973), p. xi, quoted
in Brown, “Loyalist Historiography”, p. 136.
41 David A. Wilson, “The Ambivalent Loyalists”, Acadiensis, XIV, 1 (Autumn 1984), pp. 122-37,
discussing, inter alia, works by Rawlyk, Condon, Potter, MacKinnon, Brown and Allen.
42 Bruce G. Wilson, “Loyalists”, The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. (Edmonton, 1988), II, p. 1250.
43 Historical Reflections, II (1975), pp. 51-67, republished in Paul Finkelman, ed., Slavery,
Revolutionary America and the New Nation (New York, 1989), pp. 447-63.
44 Frey, “Between Slavery and Freedom”, p. 376.
45 John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom, 7th ed. (New York, 1994),
p. 75.
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places and tried to pass as free persons; some, especially in Georgia, set up
independent “Maroon” communities beyond the reach of white authority; and some,
a minority if these numbers are to be taken seriously, joined the British. Sometimes
considerable effort was necessary to get themselves to a British or Loyalist unit (that
is, they were not “freed” by the British; they attached themselves to the British after
running away, rather than opting for one of the other alternatives).
Why did they do it? Jefferson’s thousands were not responding directly to the
Dunmore Proclamation (November 1775), for Dunmore only welcomed those who
were fit for military service. The Clinton Proclamation (June 1779), which broadened
the invitation to any fugitive claimed by a rebel, had not yet been issued when
Jefferson wrote this in 1778. Some undoubtedly were taking advantage of an
opportunity, but many came in response to a perception of British war aims. There
was a belief among the slaves, widely noted at the time and well documented, that the
British would abolish slavery if they won the revolutionary war. When fugitives
swore allegiance to the Crown, they were promised equality. An entirely new racial
order was expected. And the belief was sincere. Thomas Peters travelled all the way
to London to tell the king that promises made in his name had not been fulfilled. Of
course they were mistaken, as we now know. Britain had no such intention, though
the message seemed reasonably clear at the time: Dunmore’s “Ethiopian Regiment”,
for example, marched into battle with a banner announcing “Liberty to Slaves” across
their chests. But if the fugitives misunderstood British intentions, their mistake
cannot be twisted into an argument that they lacked political principle, that they were
seeking only their own individual advantage, that they were “not Loyalists . . . [but]
fugitive slaves deserting in response to a proclamation of martial law” (p. 79), much
less that they were “stolen property of the rebels” (p. 83).
Cahill’s argument is often contradictory (fugitives “abscond” and “desert”, yet are
“stolen”) and tautological (fugitives could not be Loyalists “precisely because they
were fugitive slaves”). Lacking a convincing argument or substantial evidence, “The
Black Loyalist Myth in Atlantic Canada” attempts to convey its message through
rhetorical contrivance. The paper opens with one of these. The reader’s attention is
drawn to the Benjamin West painting, “Reception of the American Loyalists”, with
its representation of African Americans among the Loyalists. The reader is then
invited to “infer” from the painting that black Loyalists genuinely existed. Next, the
painting is critiqued for “hiding a truth” and “presenting a falsehood”, for being
“propaganda” in fact, because one owner of the painting, John Eardley-Wilmot,
described the African Americans as “looking up to Britannia in grateful remembrance
of their emancipation from Slavery”. I have never written that the British
emancipated the slaves, nor that the black Loyalists were or should have been grateful
to Britain, but within a few paragraphs I have become associated with this “allegory”
and am numbered among the “academic scholars” principally responsible for
originating the myth that exudes from the painting! David Bell’s warning about
“socially dangerous” myths can then be invoked to lend a sense of purpose to the
assault on what Cahill calls “the Black Loyalist myth”. Actually my favourite comes
a little later, in the discussion of T.C. Haliburton. One: Haliburton used the term
“Negro Loyalists”, the first to use it that Cahill is aware of (because he was not aware
of the black Loyalists using equivalent terms themselves, as described above). Two:
Haliburton has been exposed as a racist. Three: there is therefore “some urgency”
Acadiensis100
required to “demythologize” the black Loyalists. One feels moved to salute such a
pristine example of guilt by association.
It is a bit old-fashioned these days to paint somebody with the brush of racism.
Much more appropriate for the dawn of a new millennium is to hint at “cultural
appropriation” and “assimilation” (p. 79), “turning Black people into honorary
whites”, and “the colonization of Black history by White historical myths” (p. 87).
Such phrases carry rhetorical punch in the post-colonial era. It is interesting that not
a single footnote accompanies these allegations, no quotations to illustrate what is
being denigrated. It is, apparently, the simple designation of former fugitives as
Loyalists that bears the odium. Since this is an entirely legitimate designation,
adopted by black Loyalists, British authorities and Patriots alike, confirmed by
scholars whom Cahill expressly admires, the rhetoric is hollow. In the same category
is the notion that for the fugitives themselves to have “bought into Loyalism would
have amounted to denying the slavery from which they had so recently escaped”
(p. 80), and “To label the fugitive slaves Black Loyalists is . . . to diminish the reality
of the slavery from which they managed to escape” (p. 87). This could mean that
slavery was so demeaning that it prevented African Americans from having political
motivations and that they could not have been attracted by an ideology of liberation.
If so, it is demonstrably false. It could, more likely, be another example of empty
rhetoric. Why would it be a denial of their slave past for fugitives to opt for Loyalism?
A rejection of slavery, certainly, but the fugitives openly admitted their former
enslavement in the detailed list kept, on Carleton’s orders, of black Loyalists being
evacuated from New York in 1783,46 and their numerous petitions to governors and
kings actually dwelled upon their condition as former slaves who had voluntarily
joined the British in response to certain expectations. The heated language of “The
Black Loyalist Myth in Atlantic Canada” is no more than an attempt to fill in the gaps
left by an argument in advance of its evidence.
Historical analysis consists in asking questions of the available evidence. The
answers the historian gets, usually through archival, library and oral research, are then
ordered into an explanation and written down. The questions put by the historian may
be suggested by simple curiosity, they may be dictated by the nature of the project
(undergraduate essay, Ph.D. thesis, journal article), they may be realistically limited
by the nature of the evidence or they may be deliberate elaborations on questions put
by previous scholars. Whatever the immediate influences or constraints, the questions
reflect the perspective of the author, the designer of the project, and that perspective,
in turn, is a dynamic of personal and societal concerns, issues, interests and beliefs.
This is why the time in which a historical interpretation is written can be as significant
as the time about which it is written. For example, American slavery ended more than
a century ago; nothing new has happened to change what happened then. But witness
the series of revolutions, in the past several decades, in the way slavery is understood
and explained. Each new interpretation arises from different questions, questions
46 Three copies of this list have been consulted, one in Vol. 423, PANS, another in the Carleton Papers,
British Headquarters Papers, doc. 10427, at the NYPL, and a third in Vol. 55, American Manuscripts,
Royal Institution, NAC. There is now a published version, Graham Russell Hodges, ed., The Black
Loyalist Directory (New York, 1996).
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demanding different source materials and innovative research methods. History is far
from dead, and the vitality is provided by our questions. An intriguing exercise is to
examine a piece of historical writing — a journal article perhaps — as a set of
answers, and then try to identify the questions that must have been asked to produce
those particular answers. From those questions, it is then interesting to try to discern
the apparent purpose that lay behind them, the perspective of the historian who
dreamed them up.
As for my own work, Cahill correctly identifies “the ideology and psychology of
the civil rights and human rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s” (p. 77) as a
prevailing influence during the research and writing of The Black Loyalists. My Ph.D.
thesis was entirely researched and substantially written in the late 1960s, during the
Africville dislocation, through the launching of the Transition Year Programme at
Dalhousie, amidst projects and campaigns that kept me connected to what we called
“the movement”. My academic interest was to discover how the black communities
were established and why they remained isolated and disadvantaged so late as the
1960s. I had no specific expectations about what I might find in the documents, but
I was convinced that historical study could enlighten us on the nature of the problem
and thus facilitate finding a solution. This confidence in history as a “revolutionary
act” was itself a part of the “ideology and psychology” of the times. I had a draft of
my thesis almost completed, including all the Nova Scotian chapters, when I moved
to Waterloo in 1971. When Cahill writes that I “developed the Black Loyalist
hypothesis as an antidote to Winks” (p. 82), he obviously has both the sequence and
the motivation wrong. Winks’s book, The Blacks in Canada, appeared only in 1971,
just as I was leaving Halifax for Waterloo. I brought along an as-yet unread copy, for
a review that eventually appeared in theDalhousie Review.47 In the preface to the new
edition of his book, Robin Winks writes that I was his “most formidable critic” in that
Dalhousie Review article.48 While I certainly did criticize Winks’s interpretation, I
never wrote that he failed “to put an end to the ‘victims’ school of Black Canadian
historiography”, as Cahill suggests (p. 79). That phrase is a corruption and
misapplication of something Winks wrote about my book, in the Dalhousie Review,
and what he said was that I had effectively ended the “victims school” with my study
of The Black Loyalists.49 Sometimes Cahill has discerned the wrong questions from
the answers he found in my book, and sometimes the answers themselves have been
confused.
I was not aware of Robin Winks until my own work was virtually completed. Nor
was I aware of the 1963 letter sent by Will R. Bird to the Historic Sites Advisory
Council declaring that there was nothing of historical significance about the
Birchtown community. But I was very aware of that attitude. One of the few things
written on the Sierra Leone migration when I began my study was Sir Adams
Archibald’s “Story of Deportation of Negroes from Nova Scotia to Sierra Leone”.50
“Deportation”! Note the “agency” identified in Archibald’s title. When Stephen
47 Dalhousie Review, LI (1971), pp. 282-7.
48 Winks, Blacks in Canada (1997), p. xvii.
49 Dalhousie Review, LVII (1977), p. 150.
50 Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, VII (1889-91), pp. 129-54.
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Blucke asked for details about the Sierra Leone scheme, it was “with true negro
pomposity”; when some white landowners objected to the exodus, it was because “our
people [sic] did not care to let [John Clarkson] take away the least objectionable of
the race, leaving behind only a residuum of the idle, the drunken and the dishonest”.
After all, Archibald explained, “A negro with plenty to eat and to drink, with clothing
and shelter, has little care for anything else. He has no ambition. To him labor is only
a last resort. . . . Negroes like an idle and lazy life, and have no aim or ambition for
anything beyond mere animal existence”.51 The specifics of Archibald’s attitudes
were formed in the 1880s, not the 1960s, but the notion that black people had done
nothing of historical value and, by extension, could do nothing worthy of a historian’s
attention, was still current in some circles as I began my research.
All this inevitably shaped the kind of questions I pursued. As I wrote in the preface
to the 1992 edition of The Black Loyalists, I would not have written it the same way
again. Its agenda has become old hat, even “politically correct”. How humiliating
that would be, except that 30 years ago that agenda was opposed to the conventional
wisdom of its time. Like Cahill (note 15), I recognize the liabilities of an emphasis
on black agency, black community and culture, on the things black people did rather
than what was done to them, and I have acknowledged them in a recent article in the
Dalhousie Review.52 Nevertheless it was a necessary corrective. Now we can move
on to new questions. The Black Loyalists had its value, perhaps it still has, but
“definitive history” is an oxymoron.
I can say much less about Cahill’s perspective, or his “ideology and psychology”.
His article was first sent to me with no name attached, so my response was conceived
with nothing in mind except what appeared in its pages. Only afterwards was the
name revealed and I realized that I had read some of his work before and in fact had
refereed, and recommended for publication, two articles of his on slavery for the UNB
Law Journal.53 Even before learning the name, however, it was evident from the
answers contained in the article that the author had underlying questions and concerns
about the history of slavery in the Maritimes. The article has considerable edge, and
this was far more apparent in the earlier, much longer version; here is an author with
a mission. As I perceive it, his project, and it is a commendable one, is to promote
attention to slavery in Canada, particularly the slaves brought by white Loyalists. The
assault on the black Loyalists, that is on what he calls the “myth” of the black
Loyalists, is a means, not an end. He obliges with a concise declaration of his
purpose: “to show that [the Black Loyalist hypothesis] is not only an historical myth,
but also a potentially dangerous one” (p. 78). Why dangerous? That aspect unfolds
more slowly, but it appears that “the hegemony of the Black Loyalist myth” has the
effect of “undermining Black history” (p. 81) because it “sidelines” the history of the
slaves (p. 83). To “reclaim the history of the slaves”, therefore, the black Loyalist
myth has to be “dismantled” (p. 87). In another round of circularity, Cahill also
51 Ibid., pp. 139, 140, 148, 152.
52 “Allegories and Orientations in African-Canadian Historiography: The Spirit of Africville”,
Dalhousie Review, LXXVII (1997), pp. 155-77.
53 “Slavery and the Judges of Loyalist Nova Scotia”, University of New Brunswick Law Journal, XLIII
(1994), pp. 73-134, and “Habeas Corpus and Slavery in Nova Scotia”, XLIV (1995), pp. 179-209.
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explains that “The unfortunate embryonic state of slave studies in Atlantic Canada has
contributed to the persistence of the historical myth of the Black Loyalists” (p. 83),
but I think this contradiction is inadvertent and his point in general must be that it is
the “myth” that is suppressing the slaves. I heartily agree that the history of slavery
in the Maritimes has been neglected, and, as I wrote in my UNB Law Journal report,
Cahill’s own contributions to this topic are to be welcomed. We need more, and we
need more from Cahill in particular. It would, as he says (p. 82), be possible for
someone to undertake a Trudel-like study of the Atlantic region, and I join him in
making such an appeal. I do have to wonder, however, why the promotion of slave
history requires the elaborate and indirect approach taken in this article.
It must be that Cahill genuinely believes in the existence of a black Loyalist
“myth”, and that it creates a barrier to him and other researchers who might take up
the story of the slaves. What is this dangerous “myth” that Cahill finds so
threatening? Its first feature, according to his article, is that it portrays a benevolent
Britain graciously emancipating the slaves. This is the intended point of the Benjamin
West diversion (p. 76), and it is given priority as “an important element” of the alleged
myth (p. 77). Except for Cahill’s frequent insistence that the black Loyalists were
“freed, not free”, which seems to confirm rather than contradict the mythical
emancipation by the British, I can join him in rejecting the gracious Britannia image.
It is a myth, and I repeat what I wrote in The Black Loyalists: “Of the theories and
rationalisations later offered to explain the British stand, it is clear that an abolitionist
sentiment cannot seriously be included among them. The slaves belonging to
Loyalists were never offered their freedom. . . . In an empire still very much
determined to maintain the institution of slavery and the continuation of the slave
trade, the Dunmore proclamation and Britain’s subsequent extension of it can only be
viewed in isolation as a desperate attempt to bring the rebellious colonies to their
knees by any available means”.54 The proclamations invited slaves to run away, they
did not free them; what they said was, once the slaves freed themselves from Patriot
claimants, the British would recognize them as free British subjects. This part of the
myth can be disarmed, like a related mythical claim that the fugitives were allegedly
choosing loyalism rather than liberty from slavery (pp. 80, 87). The entire point of
the first chapter of The Black Loyalists, and of my article on “The Slaves’ War for
Independence”, was that fugitives joined the British because they believed it would
mean liberty, for themselves and for other slaves. Cahill is quite right to unite with
me in denying that loyalty to the Crown took priority over the commitment to freedom
from slavery.
The “myth” Cahill describes seems to propagate an impression that once they
joined the British, and after evacuation to the Maritimes, the black Loyalists were
treated equally by their government and their neighbours (pp. 80, 82, 87). Chapter 3
of The Black Loyalists, entitled “Freedom Denied”, can contribute to Cahill’s arsenal
against this aspect of the “myth”. “Promoters of the Black Loyalist concept”,
however, may be hard to convince, for apparently they “overlook Loyalist
slaveholders” (p. 82). I wish I could direct those myth-mongers to the passage quoted
above from The Black Loyalists, or to other passages in my book where I make it clear
54 The Black Loyalists, p. 2.
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that “The Nova Scotia that offered a haven to fleeing American slaves was not itself
innocent of the evils of slavery. . . . An estimated 1,232 slaves . . . were brought by
Loyalists from the former American colonies. . . . This placed severe limitations on
the freedom and opportunities of the Black Loyalists”, or to the pages where the re-
enslavement of black Loyalists in Nova Scotia is documented.55 I wish I could direct
them to the efforts taken by the now-free black Loyalists to eliminate slavery in the
Maritimes, their court appearances on behalf of fellow African Canadians who were
enslaved, and above all to Thomas Peters’ second petition in 1790 denouncing the
“avowed Toleration of Slavery in Nova Scotia as if the happy Influence of his
Majesty’s free Government was incapable of being extended so far as America to
‘maintain Justice and Right’ in affording the Protection of the Laws and Constitution
of England. . . . [T]he oppressive Cruelty and Brutality of their Bondage is in General
shocking to human nature but more particularly shocking irritating and obnoxious to
their Brethren of the same Kindred the free People of Colour who cannot conceive
that it is really the Intention of the British Government to favour Injustice, or tolerate
Slavery. . .”.56
This evidence would certainly convince the mythologizers, but I cannot direct
them to it because I do not know who they are. I think I have read most of the
published literature on this subject, and nowhere do I find the benevolent Britannia,
the slaves opting for loyalism rather than liberty, the equal treatment of black
Loyalists during the Revolution or in the Maritimes, the denial that black people
continued to be enslaved by white Loyalists. I read these things first in “The Black
Loyalist Myth in Atlantic Canada”. Unfortunately the article contains no references
to actual examples, so a reader is unable to locate the source of the error. Without
them, an impression emerges that Cahill has erected a “straw myth”, created as a
target to justify an assault on a historical interpretation that is perceived as
“dangerous” enough to require such a tactic. The specific characteristics of the myth,
the features that might deserve to be “dismantled”, are imaginary; more
fundamentally, recognition of former fugitives as Loyalists has convincing
contemporary evidence and cannot possibly be a recent deception perpetrated by an
ideologically-driven group of academics. In short, the “myth” is a myth.
Everyone who cares about history and thinks history is important wants to ensure
that it is reported as accurately as possible. This, I am sure, is what motivated Cahill
to point out errors he believed he found in my publications, and this is why I have
pointed out the errors I believe I found in his article. This is the way it works. I hope
I have set his mind at rest, and that he can now proceed with his research on slavery.
There are many topics worth pursuing in the early history of the African-Canadian
communities, many new questions that deserve answers. The final word has not been
uttered.
Were the black Loyalists Loyalists? For students trying to make sense of our
national history, this could be an interesting way to approach the Loyalist contribution
to the foundation of English Canada, and indeed of the nature of Canadian society as
it has been constructed historically. I believe Cahill would agree that whichever way
55 Ibid., pp. 40-2, 50-1.
56 26 December 1790, FO 4/1, PRO.
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the investigation leads, it will expose a shocking component of racial injustice that,
once ensconced in the minds and institutions of Canada, has been perpetuated and has
still not been overcome. I am not yet ready to give up the notion that an understanding
of the origins of the problem is a prerequisite to finding a solution. And if they were
Loyalists, would this serve for anything more than to give their descendants a sense
of self-importance, a little me-tooism? For one thing, it would force attention to the
actual events, in the Revolution and especially in Loyalist Nova Scotia, to try to
explain how one group of Loyalists was excluded from full membership in society.
If they were never Loyalists, then that in itself is explanation enough. But if there was
a good reason why they should have been included, and still were not, then a whole
new bundle of insights becomes available. And yes, their descendants are concerned,
and not just those with a direct lineage to 1783. Few African Canadians in the
Maritimes are able to trace their ancestry so precisely, though the documents are
available to do quite a bit of it. The Black Loyalist Heritage Society is trying to
compile a “census” of descendants, and it is proving very difficult not just because
some families do not know but because so many have intermarried with other
lineages, both from slaves or later black migrations and, often, from Loyalist and
other white families. This absence of precision has not produced disinterest; on the
contrary, it has obviated any exclusive ownership of the Loyalist heritage and makes
it available to all members of the black community. What that heritage means, in a
word, is entitlement. This is not, or not just, a moral issue, it is not just political
correctitude, it cannot be dismissed as cultural appropriation or colonization (pp. 80,
87): it means that black people were full founding members of Maritime society, to
whom the same promises were made, and owed, as to any other Loyalists. It is time
for some retroactive recognition, not only from academic historians but from our
society, and our governments, who have still to deliver.
JAMES W. St.G. WALKER
